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The family—that dear octopus from whose tentacles we never quite escape 
-Dodie Smith , Dear Octopus, 1932 
 
Social sciences research has long recognized that the characteristics of an individual’s family and 
the relationships among family members can have important implications for the individual’s 
economic outcomes.  Among the interesting findings emerging from this literature are insights 
regarding (1) the effect of having numerous siblings, (2) involvement in kin networks, (3) the 
volume of inter-family transfers in the United States, (4) the motives for and consequences of 
such transfers, and (5) the economic circumstances experienced by different branches of a family 
tree.  This paper explores the connection between these family matters and saving behavior. 
 
Previous research has noted that the number of siblings that a child has can influence that child’s 
life chances by affecting the amount of resources that parents have to spend on or invest in a 
given child during critical phases of childhood.  More siblings can mean poorer outcomes during 
adulthood due to resource dilution.  Previous research also has investigated the relationship 
between parents and their adult children, revealing both that the desire and ability to control 
children can affect bequests, and that individuals’ labor market prospects and wealth outcomes 
are influenced by parental bequests and intervivos transfers.  The research in this area offers 
ample evidence to suggest that significant transfers are made from parent to child during 
children’s adulthood among well-to-do families--be it in the form of “gifts” of tuition assistance 
(Becker and Tomes, 1979; Drazen, 1978; and Laitner and Juster, 1996), downpayment assistance 
for home purchases (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995; and Charles and Hurst, 2000), or sheer transfers 
of wealth at death (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; and Menchik and Jianakoplos, 1997).1 
 
Other research has examined a broader range of family relationships, taking a particular interest 
in economic and non-economic transfers and exchange among all types of kin (Stack, 1974; 
Schoeni, 1992; Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; and Roschelle, 1997; for example).  This literature 
suggests that family resources are not necessarily expended solely on behalf of the nuclear 
family.  Additional recent research on the economic characteristics of extended families suggests 
that while it is standard to find a high degree of similarity in siblings’ positions and fathers’ and 
sons’ social and economic positions when one examines national data, not all families display 
this similarity between sibling-sibling and parent-child outcomes.  Instead, poverty among 
relatives appears to be an issue for some non-poor families in the U.S. population (Pattillo-
McCoy, 1999; and Pattillo-McCoy and Heflin, 1999). 
 
This vast, provocative literature on connections between different family members and on the 
bearing that the family situation can have on an individual’s life serves as the inspiration for our 
research.  We ask whether ties between adult relatives affect the ability to accumulate wealth.  
More specifically, we seek to determine whether having poor relatives has any effect on asset 
accumulation for non-poor families.  We arrive at this research question because the 
aforementioned literature provides ample evidence that many economic outcomes are affected by 
the family situation—hence it seems critical to ask whether the family-based forces that shape 
individuals’ labor market outcomes and educational levels also affect saving.  Additionally, we 
pose the question because research on kin networks suggests that the concept of the individual or 
nuclear family may be too narrow to characterize decisionmaking in practice.  Finally, we 
                                                          
1 By “significant” we mean those that are either large in magnitude or transformative for the recipient. 
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suspect that there are important connections to be made between the findings that many black 
families experience poverty in their extended families, and the findings of race differences in 
asset ownership that permeate the literature on wealth inequality (Blau and Graham, 1991; Oliver 
and Shapiro, 1995; Wolff, 1998; Hurst, Luoh and Stafford, 1998; for example). 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II briefly reviews the separate literatures on the 
family and wealth inequality. Section III examines economic theories of saving to determine how 
the predictions about saving that emerge from these models are affected by modifying the 
standard representation of utility to incorporate concern for poor relatives in individual 
decisionmaking.  Section IV presents our empirical work, including the descriptive statistics 
covering asset accumulation among U.S. families and data on the extent of poverty within the 
family (among siblings and parents).  It also presents the results of regression analysis that 
examines the effects that poverty among siblings and parents have on a number of dimensions of 
asset accumulation.  Section V discusses the policy implications of the research and the 
relevance of our work for public debates about social justice.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  The literature on family relationships and the literature on wealth inequality 
Thinking about family relationships 
 
Ours is not the first paper to demonstrate an interest in the existence of connections between 
different family members, although the way that we think about family relationships ultimately 
will differ somewhat from the existing economics literature.  Economics typically explores and 
models family relationships in the context of altruism, or the interdependence of utility among 
different agents.  The research of Becker (1991), which specifies utility as being a weighted 
combination of an individual’s own felicity function and a family member’s utility function, is 
representative of the framework used in economics to introduce concern about other family 
members into economic analysis.  Much of the research in economics has focused either on two-
sided altruism, where both agents whose utility functions are represented exhibit some concern 
for one another (Stark, 1995 for example), or on one-sided altruism on the part of parents 
concerned about their children’s outcomes in life (Laitner and Juster, 1996; and Masson, 1997; 
for example). Our research marks an effort to examine altruism on the part of adult children.  It 
therefore necessitates a shift toward thinking about adults who exhibit concern for the plight of 
their parents, and their siblings, in addition to their own individual condition. 
 
Outside of economics, the concern that individuals exhibit for other family members has led 
researchers to challenge the notion that the concept of a “selfish” or self-contained individual 
agent represents the appropriate unit of analysis for studies of actual behavior.  This may be 
particularly true for minorities, as research suggests that non-white families frequently are 
embedded in networks that tie them financially, socially, and emotionally to others (Stack, 1974; 
Taylor and Chatters, 1988).  Such research provides an additional impetus for modifying the 
standard economic representation of “individual” choice.  Evidence that individual resources 
may be spent on a variety of family members (be they individuals inside the nuclear family or 
“outside” family members) not only suggests that the circumstances of different family members 
influences individual decisions; it also introduces the possibility that some relatives’ needs may 
serve as a constraint on others’ behavior and purchases.  Accordingly, this suggests that the 
social ties to the less fortunate that have been uncovered for some middle class families in the 
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U.S. population (Pattillo-McCoy, 1999 and Pattillo-McCoy and Heflin, 1999, for example) may 
create a basis for economic ties within families that inhibit the non-poor family members’ ability 
to engage in “traditional” or “expected” middle class activities such as wealth accumulation. 
 
Thinking about wealth inequality 
 
We will not attempt to provide any detailed evidence to prove that wealth is unevenly distributed 
in the United States because this point has been demonstrated conclusively elsewhere.2  Instead, 
we note that regardless of the measure of wealth chosen (be it net worth, financial wealth, dollars 
held in individual assets, or asset ownership rates), one finds substantial differences by class and 
by race.  For example, Oliver and Shapiro report that black families hold about 25 cents for 
every dollar of wealth held by white families on average; and, only about  11 cents if one 
restricts the analysis to financial assets (Oliver and Shapiro, 1995).  Additionally, Haveman and 
Wolff (2000) reveals that minorities have higher rates of “asset poverty” than white families do.3  
There are similar race differences in ownership rates for individual assets such as stocks and 
bank accounts, and these differences remain even when the demographic and economic variables 
believed to determine wealth accumulation are taken into consideration (Hurst, Luoh and 
Stafford, 1998; Chiteji and Stafford, 1999). 
 
Why is this important?  An individual’s (or family’s) wealth level can affect that individual’s 
quality of life (Sherraden, 1991; Page-Adams and Sherraden, 1996, for example).  Wealth is a 
stock of savings that can be used to guard against shocks to income, allowing the individual to 
continue to consume in instances in which the normal flow of income is disrupted (due to job 
loss or retirement, for example).  Savings also can be instrumental in ensuring that one has 
access to credit (because many loans require collateral).  Additionally, saved funds can be used 
to surmount indivisibilities associated with expensive purchases that exceed one’s current 
income flow in instances in which outside financing is unavailable or insufficient  (educational 
investments for example).  Wealth also can have important implications for child outcomes 
(Conley, 1999; and Shapiro and Johnson, 2000).  For example, an individual’s parents’ wealth 
holdings can influence that individual’s life prospects if parental savings are used to ensure that a 
child has access to post-secondary schooling, or to prestigious private schooling at the 
elementary and secondary levels (Shapiro and Johnson, 2000).  This discussion highlights an 
important connection between living standards and asset accumulation.  For those with assets (or 
those whose parents have assets), asset-ownership can improve the asset-owner’s standard of 
living.  For this reason, research that focuses on the role of family variables such as family size, 
marital status, or “having a rich uncle” in shaping wealth accumulation is enlightening (Blau and 
Graham, 1990; Menchik and Jianakoplos, 1997; and Keister, 2000, for example).  Yet, there is 
another dimension to the connection between living standards and asset accumulation.  A 
second, less recognized connection, is that the living standards of others may affect one’s ability 
to accumulate assets.   
                                                          
2 Blau and Graham (1991), Oliver and Shapiro (1995), Wolff (1995, 1998), and Hurst, Luoh and Stafford (1999) 
each provide a discussion of the wealth gap.  For a comparison of the findings from these papers, see Chiteji and 
Stafford (1999). 
3 Haveman and Wolff (2000) defines “asset poverty” as a situation in which an individual or family has insufficient 
wealth to meet their basic needs for some limited period of time when there are no other resources available.  The 
poverty threshold and an absolute standard of $5,000 in wealth are both employed to define the level of consumption 
that corresponds a household’s basic needs, and different time frames are considered.   
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III. Economic theories of saving  
 
The central hypothesis to be examined in this paper is whether the economic circumstances of 
poor relatives affect a non-poor individual’s saving behavior.  We know from the research of 
others that being poor has significant implications for a poor individual’s ability to accumulate 
assets—because of what it means for that individual’s personal resources (Wolff, 1995, for 
example) and for the individual’s access to savings-building institutional devices  (Sherraden, 
1991, for example).  We now seek to determine whether it also has implications for a non-poor 
relative’s ability to accumulate wealth.  To assess these implications from the standpoint of 
economic theory, we turn to three simple but standard “models” of saving (each depicting a 
separate economic motive for saving), and we ask how the incorporation of altruism affects each 
model’s predictions regarding saving. 
 
Consideration of this issue requires us to first specify a model of altruism, so that it can be 
applied to the different theories of saving.  The static utility function that forms the basis for our 
analysis is,  
(1) 
)()
_
()( RFRRE CVCCsBCsUsVs −+=  
where Us represents a standard felicity function for the non-poor individual and VR(CR) is the 
utility function of his poor relative.   
 
Cs represents the consumption level of agent s, whose utility is the focus of the optimization 
problem.  This agent is presumed to not be poor.  CRE represents the consumption endowment of 
this person’s relative.  A relative is considered poor if his endowment is low.  Bs is a function 
such that for CRE < 
_
C , Bs is positive; and the interpretation given to its arguments is that 
_
C  
represents some minimal standard of consumption that the non-poor agent s views as acceptable 
for his less fortunate relative. (A natural interpretation might be the official poverty line.)  The 
variable CRF  represents the relative’s final consumption level. 
 
A few words about this specification are warranted.  First, as is standard in economic models of 
altruism, we assume that the relative’s utility function enters into the primary agent’s utility 
function with a weight, represented by the Bs term.  This allows the possibility that the non-poor 
agent does not view his own well-being and that of his relative as completely interchangeable.  
Second, in the above framework the utility of the poor relative is not dependent on the utility of 
the non-poor agent.  This reflects the assumption that the nature of altruism is such that non-poor 
individuals are concerned about members of their family who have low consumption 
endowments (which can be interpreted as living in poverty), while a poor person is presumed to 
have no reason to worry about the welfare of well-to-do relatives.  Intuitively, it is possible to 
view this as one person having an interest in the other party, and in whether this relative will 
starve to death (in an extreme case), rather than an interest in completely sharing resources.  
Third, this model of altruism allows for the weight attached to the relative’s utility to vary.  In 
fact, we hypothesize that it will vary such that if one’s relative’s consumption endowment does 
not fall below some minimum standard, a non-poor individual will not worry about the welfare 
of his relative.  Hence Bs is an increasing function of the gap between
_
C and CRE (which can be 
thought of as a gap between the poverty line and the poor relative’s personal resources).  
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Additionally, Bs = 0 if CRE ≥ 
_
C .  This implies that it is only if the poor relative falls below the 
poverty line, that his well-being will affect the utility of his non-poor relative (and, more 
specifically, the non-poor relative receives satisfaction from raising his poor relative’s standard 
of living).  To the contrary, if the relative’s consumption level exceeds the poverty line, the non-
poor individual no longer receives satisfaction from helping the relative.  Finally, for simplicity it 
is assumed that when CRE < 
_
C , the non-poor relative will make a fixed transfer—“t”—to his 
poor relative in order to make up for the shortfall.  This implies that t=
_
C - CRE.4 Figure 1. 
compares our representation of altruism to other, standard representations in the literature.  We 
next examine the implications of an individual’s having the utility function specified in (1) for 
the individual’s saving behavior. 
 
Figure 1.  Different Representations of Altruistic Utility 
The Becker (1961) and  Stark (1995) frameworks 
 
Our framework 
Vs = Us(Cs) + ψVR(CRF) 
 
Where VR may be a function of Us(Cs) [Stark, 1995] 
and ψ, the weight attached to one’s relatives utility, 
is constant [Becker, 1961; Stark, 1995] 
Vs =Us(Cs) + Bs(
_
C -CRE)VR(CRF) 
 
Where Bs(⋅) is dependent upon CRE 
and VR is not a function of Us 
 
The effects of concern about poor relatives on saving for retirement 
 
Incorporating (1) in a simple two period model of saving in which the motive for saving is to 
secure funds for retirement and solving for the optimal levels of  consumption and saving yields 
a mixed prediction as to how saving will be affected.5  Because 
_
C and CRE are constants, concern 
about poor relatives ultimately affects the saving decision by entering the constraint on 
individual s’ optimization exercise.  An individual desiring to assist a poor relative experiences a 
reduction in the amount of resources that are available for his own use.  This puts downward 
pressure on own consumption in both periods (Cs), and the reduction in second period 
consumption necessarily leads to a reduction in the amount the non-poor individual desires to 
save.  However, in a situation in which the non-poor individual anticipates making a transfer to 
his poor relative in the second period, there also will be upward pressure on current saving.  It 
will have to rise (relative to the case in which there is no altruism) in order to provide for the 
second period consumption of the poor relative.  One can think of such a case as one in which 
the non-poor individual now has two people to support during the retirement years.   How 
savings is affected by the presence of altruism therefore depends upon which effect is stronger.  
The conclusions emerging from the model are somewhat sensitive to the assumptions one makes 
                                                          
4 The reader probably will note that a rational agent will only make a transfer if the reduction in utility due to a 
decrease in his own consumption is offset by the boost to utility that emerges from helping a poor relative.  We do 
not derive such a result as a condition of the maximization exercise.  Instead we note that our analysis applies only 
to the group of individuals for whom this condition holds.  They are the only agents whom economists would expect 
to observe making transfers in practice.  If there is sufficient heterogeneity in the population, particularly in terms of 
the consumption levels of the type s agents and the CRE endowments, it is reasonable to argue that there will be some 
agents who satisfy this criterion. 
5 Formal mathematical representations of the three saving models discussed in this section are provided in a 
mathematical appendix (available from the authors upon request). 
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regarding the discount rate, the interest rate, and the number of periods in which the non-poor 
individual will make transfers to his poor relative.6  The ambiguity is interesting.  Intuition might 
suggest that transfers to poor relatives would always displace, or “crowd out,” saving.  However, 
analysis of economic theory indicates that this is not always the case.  
 
In the simplest case in which there is no discounting, a zero interest rate, and a relative who is 
poor in both periods, concern about the poor relative does not affect the level of savings. In the 
absence of discounting and no ability to earn interest on savings, the non-poor individual will 
want his consumption levels to be equal across time.  The “reduction” to income represented by 
the desire to make transfers therefore is spread evenly between his first period consumption and 
his second period consumption.  If the rate of transfers is constant, period two consumption falls 
and depresses the non-poor individual’s need to save for his own retirement by the exact amount 
that savings is raised to help finance the second period consumption of the poor relative. 
 
With a positive discount rate but no ability to earn interest, the effect of introducing concern 
about a poor relative is ambiguous.  It is not possible to tell how much second period 
consumption falls unless one has precise information about the individual’s preferences.7 
 
In a world in which the interest rate is positive and agents discount future utility (and one in 
which the subjective rate of time preference is equivalent to the interest rate), concern about poor 
relatives has no net effect on overall savings if that concern extends for both periods, but leads to 
a decrease in savings if the non-poor agent only has to assist his relative during the first period.  
Under this scenario, the non-poor individual will prefer that his consumption levels be equal 
across the two time periods.  However, the ability to earn interest on savings implies that he will 
reduce first period consumption by more than he reduces saving for his own retirement.  If the 
non-poor individual also has an obligation to save to make a transfer to his relative in the second 
period (which can be thought of as saving for his relative’s second period consumption), first 
period consumption and saving for own retirement must fall enough to allow for a current 
transfer and a future one.  However, the fall in saving for own retirement ends up being exactly 
offset by the amount that saving must rise to permit a transfer in the amount of t during the 
second period.  Hence the net effect on saving is zero.  If, to the contrary, the non-poor 
individual only needs to assist his relative during the first period, the non-poor individual simply 
reduces saving to account for the smaller consumption level that is desired for period two, and 
there is no countervailing upward pressure on saving.  Concern for poor relatives creates a 
situation in which the need to make transfers crowds out saving. 
                                                          
6 Economics allows for the possibility that individuals do not view the present and the future as completely 
interchangeable.  It often is assumed that individuals care more about the present than the future to some degree, and 
this is reflected in the existence of a “discount rate.”  It denotes the rate at which the future is discounted, 
representing the fact that less weight is attached to future events (consumption in this instance), than present events. 
7 If, for example, preferences are homothetic, one can use the resulting knowledge that first and second period 
consumption are proportional to draw inferences about the magnitude of the reduction in second period consumption 
that occurs when income “falls” due to the need to make transfers.  If the ratio of second and first period 
consumption is a fixed proportion, it can be shown that the change in second period consumption (brought about by 
the reduction in income) is proportional to the change in first period consumption, and the value of the 
proportionality constant can be used to determine whether the change in second period consumption is less than or 
greater than t (the amount that needs to be transferred to the poor relative in the second period).  It then is possible to 
determine whether the upward pressure on saving resulting from the need to make a transfer during the second 
period exceeds the downward push attributable to the decrease in desired second period consumption.  
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It is interesting that such simple models can yield such variety in results.  The appeal to theory 
does not allow us to determine the exact nature of the effect to be expected.  How saving is 
affected appears to be more of an empirical question than a theoretical one, depending upon what 
the relative strengths of the two different sources of pressure on saving are in practice. 
 
The effect of concern about a poor relative on saving to acquire an indivisible good 
 
We use a two-period version of the Besley, Coate and Loury (1993) model of saving to acquire 
an indivisible good to investigate the effect that concern about poor relatives has when saving is 
motivated by this consideration.8  The finding is that savings will fall.  Relative to the no transfer 
case, the individual who is concerned about a poor relative will reduce the amount that he saves 
in any given period and instead increase the amount of time (or number of periods) that he 
spends saving to acquire the indivisible good. 
 
The effect of concern about a poor relative in a model of precautionary saving 
 
As was the case for retirement saving, it is difficult to determine how introducing concern about 
a poor relative into a model of precautionary saving will affect saving.  Precautionary saving 
refers to saving motivated by uncertainty about future income, i.e., the fact that many individuals 
do not know what their future earnings will be.  Even when there is no uncertainty surrounding 
the need to make transfers, concern for poor relatives mimics the effect of a reduction in 
expected future income, which puts upward pressure on savings.  The desire to make transfers 
also “reduces” current income however, which puts downward pressure on savings.  The net 
effect associated with the introduction about concern for poor relatives is therefore ambiguous.  
If, instead, the concern for poor relatives is manifested as uncertainty about future outlays to a 
poor relative (only), this will create uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of resources that will 
be available to meet the personal consumption needs of the non-poor individual, and an 
individual whose utility depends upon his own well-being and a relative’s will be expected to 
save more than he would were he not altruistic. 
 
Summarizing the lessons from economic theory 
 
Taken in its entirety, economic theory yields mixed predictions as to how concern about poor 
relatives will affect an individual’s savings.  Despite this ambiguity, the models are interesting 
because they suggests that there is no theoretical reason to expect the need to make transfers will 
necessarily “crowd out” saving.  The models do suggest, however, that one may find some effect 
when one conducts empirical work.  The precise direction that the effect will take turns out to be 
an empirical question because it is only through observation that one can tell which motive for 
saving applies (or dominates) in practice and what borrowing and saving conditions different 
individuals face.  Having examined the theoretical elements of the argument that concern about 
poor relatives will affect saving, we now turn to an empirical investigation of the research 
question. 
                                                          
8 Economics defines an indivisible good as an item that cannot be acquired on a piecemeal basis.  If the cost of this 
good exceeds an individual’s resources in a given period, the individual will have to borrow or save in order to 
acquire the good.  For individuals who face borrowing constraints, this therefore will provide a motive for saving. 
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IV.  Empirical research:  data, methodology, descriptive statistics and regression results 
 
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to explore the relationship 
between poverty in the family and asset accumulation empirically.  The PSID is a nationally 
representative, longitudinal survey of U.S. households that began in 1968.  It has followed its 
original families and the newly formed families that have emerged as children from the original 
families reached adulthood, since that date.9  Because of the way that the survey is constructed, 
the PSID offers the ability to examine a set of families, and the families of their adult siblings 
and parents concurrently.  Data from the core survey and from the special 1984, 1989, and 1999 
Wealth Supplements are used in this analysis. 
 
It is important to note that our paper is not the first paper to present data covering poverty in the 
family, nor is it the only paper that empirically investigates the relationship between such 
poverty and wealth.  Pattillo-McCoy and Heflin (1999) and Heflin and Pattillo-McCoy (2000) 
examine data on middle class families from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, and they 
find (1) that the black middle class is more likely than the white middle class to experience 
sibling poverty, (2) that having a poor sibling affects home ownership and bank account 
ownership, and (3) that having come from a family that was poor is negatively associated with 
home ownership and bank account ownership.  Because the NLSY only contains data on siblings 
and presents less data on wealth-holding than the PSID however, our empirical research provides 
a unique opportunity to add to the understanding of family circumstances and their effect on a 
variety of measures of asset accumulation.10 
 
Our analysis focuses on middle class families and, as is standard in the social sciences literature, 
it invokes three different measures of class—income, education, and occupation.  Economists 
regularly use income to group and categorize households, because income represents the primary 
type of resource that most families have to meet their needs.  Elsewhere in the social sciences, it 
is also common to use occupation and education to define class status.  For occupation, this 
tradition dates back to Weber, who argued that Marx’s emphasis on ownership of the means of 
production as a way of classifying societal members was insufficient because it failed to 
recognize the unique position of laborers who did not own any capital, but who nonetheless 
possessed some degree of  power, control, or choice over their working conditions, and a greater 
amount of prestige or status than other workers (Landry, 1987).  Using occupational status as an 
alternative way to conceptualize class recognizes such heterogeneity among workers.  The social 
sciences’ status attainment literature also identifies education as a measure of class, arguing that 
education serves as a mechanism for positioning one’s self in the productive sphere of the 
marketplace.  Our analysis therefore also incorporates an education-based measure of class.   
 
Our sample of middle class families is obtained from the 1994 PSID, and it includes about 1,700 
to 3,000 middle class families (depending upon the definition of middle class that is employed).11  
                                                          
9 Annually through 1997 and bi-annually beginning in 1997. 
10 This is particularly true given that the “having come from a poor family” measure used in Heflin and Pattillo-
McCoy would not capture the present circumstances faced by parents.  It is a measure of whether or not the child 
lived in a family that was poor in 1978.  Using the PSID allows us to obtain the current measures of the parents’ 
economic circumstances that our analysis requires. 
11 More details about the construction of the different measures used in the analysis are available in an appendix 
available from the authors upon request.  One important point to note, however, is that the PSID allows us to follow 
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The middle class income sample includes families whose incomes fall within the middle 60 
percent of the income distribution.  The middle class education sample is constructed by 
selecting families in which the head or the “wife” possesses a college degree (at least).12  Our 
middle class occupation category is constructed by selecting families in which the head or the 
wife possesses a job that is classified as managerial or professional, according to Census 
categorizations. 
 
Patterns of financial asset ownership across middle class family groupings 
 
Examination of data on the proportion of middle class families holding individual financial 
assets reveals that middle class black families differ from middle class whites in terms of their 
“success” in accumulating assets.  As shown in Table 1, middle class black families exhibit 
lower rates of asset ownership than white families when one examines specific individual 
financial assets, and they posses lower wealth than their white counterparts.  For example, when 
one examines middle income families one finds that, on average, white families have anywhere 
from three-and-a-half to five times as much net worth as black families.   
 
In the case of bank accounts, about 87 percent of middle income white families own a bank 
account, while only about 54 percent of middle income black families hold this type of financial 
asset.  Among white collar and college educated white families, account ownership rates are 
much higher—in the realm of 90 percent—while black families in these middle class categories 
continue to lag behind their white counterparts.  
 
The asset ownership rate differences are even more striking for stocks.  Among middle income 
whites, about 35 percent of families hold stock.   This is more than twice the number of similarly 
situated black families that own stock.  In the middle class occupation and middle class 
education categories, the differences are also great.  Over one-half of white collar white families 
own stock, and about three-fifths of college educated white families own stock, while less than 
one-third of black families in white collar occupations hold stock and only one-fifth of college 
educated black families hold this particular financial asset.   
 
Patterns of poverty in the family 
 
Our data also allow us to comment on the extent to which there is poverty among kin within 
black and white middle class families.  As shown in Table 2, an examination of the economic 
status of the parents of the middle class, as defined by the middle income category, reveals that 
the average income of a parents among middle class black families is about $22,000, and that the 
average income of parents among middle class white families is about $49,000 (both expressed 
in constant, 1996 dollars).  Additionally, among parents, poverty rates are higher for blacks than 
they are for whites.  For example, about one-third of the parents of middle income blacks are 
poor, when poverty is defined as falling below the poverty threshold that is specified by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
one side of the family tree only.  This means that we have a rich array of information about parents and adult 
siblings of the sample member, but not his or her spouse.  This suggests an errors-in-variable problem, which would 
make our empirical results subject to attenuation bias (so that our coefficient estimates may only provide a lower 
bound on the true size of the effects that we estimate).   
12 The PSID includes cohabitating households with households in which two partners are married legally. 
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United States Census Bureau, while fewer than one-tenth of the parents of middle income white 
families are in this position.  Additionally, about one-fifth of the parents of middle income black 
families receive aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) or food stamps, while only 
about four percent of the parents of middle income whites are poor according to this indicator.  
When receipt of public housing is used as an indication of low economic status, about one-
quarter of the parents of middle income black families are found to be poor, while just under 5 
percent of the parents of middle income white families are in a similar position.  Lastly, the rate 
of unemployment for black parents is about four times as large as the white parental 
unemployment rate.  The race differences are similar in the other middle class categories.  As 
Pattillo-McCoy and Heflin (1999) found in their analysis of siblings, our data on the economic 
status of parents indicates that middle class blacks experience a greater degree of poverty in the 
family than middle class whites do.  Similar racial differences exist among parents when 
occupation and educational levels are used to define middle class status.   
 
The data on the economic status of siblings also show differences by race in the extent of poverty 
in the family.  As shown in Table 3, among siblings, mean family income is higher for whites 
than it is for blacks—about $50,600 compared to $24,337 when the siblings of middle income 
families are examined.  The average income to needs ratios also is greater—4.4 compared to 2.3.  
Furthermore, the proportion of siblings who fall below the poverty line, the rate of AFDC or 
foodstamp program participation, reliance on public housing, and the rate of unemployment are 
all greater for blacks than they are for whites.  These differences exist whether income, 
occupation, or education is used to denote middle class status. 
 
Regression results   
 
To determine whether there is an empirical connection between a family’s asset accumulation 
and the economic circumstances of its kin, we estimate probit regressions for bank account 
ownership and for stock ownership, and an ordinary least squares regression using overall wealth 
(net worth) as the dependent variable.  Account and stock ownership represent important 
dimensions of asset accumulation.  Actual ownership, or entry into a given asset market, is a 
prerequisite to accumulating wealth, and bank accounts and stock regularly receive special 
attention in the wealth literature because accounts are considered to be a ‘basic” asset that all 
families can use, while stock ownership has been key to rapidly growing portfolios throughout 
the 1990s.  We include overall wealth levels in our analysis because net worth describes a key 
component of economic well-being:  A family’s total wealth holdings reflect the total amount of 
resources that are available to it.  Virtually all assets can be liquidated in times of emergency, or 
to meet whatever needs to which a family wishes to put its savings to use.13   
 
While it was an awareness of the literature on black families’ participation in kin networks that 
motivated our research question, there seems no reason to expect that the white families that do 
have poor relatives will be immune from pressure to assist these relatives.  We therefore report 
the results from regressions using data for all families.14 
                                                          
13 Even the more illiquid assets, such as housing, can be used as a source of funds in times of emergency, as families 
can borrow against the equity in their homes, for example. 
14 This paper discusses the full sample results only.  Regressions for split samples were run and the results are 
available from the authors upon request.  In the separate regressions for blacks, poverty in the family is not found to 
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Tables 4, 5 and 6 list the regression results for bank account ownership, stock ownership, and 
wealth, respectively.15  Each of the tables provides a series of results that include baseline 
controls for the economic and demographic variables that are standard in the literature – along 
with additional regressions that also include indicators of parental and sibling poverty status.  
Respondent’s AGE and age-squared (AGESQ) are used to capture life-cycle effects. Additional 
economic controls are the respondent’s years of schooling (EDUCATION), a five year average 
income measure (AVG. LIFETIME INCOME), and an indicator of managerial or professional 
occupational membership (MGR AND PROF OCCUPATION).16  The demographic controls are 
the respondent’s number of children (CHILDREN), and indicators of whether the household 
head is FEMALE, MARRIED, and/or self-identifies as racially black (BLACK).   
 
In each of the tables there are six specifications that include a parental or sibling poverty 
indicator.  PNEED represents a composite measure of the pressure that a middle class family 
faces to assist its parents.  This measure indicates whether the respondent had a parent who 
satisfied at least one of the following in 1994: (1) lives in a household classified in poverty 
according to their family’s income-to-needs, (2) lives in public housing or received a public 
housing or heating subsidy, and (3) is enrolled in an Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC) or the 
food stamp program.  SNEED is a similar measure that gauges pressure to assist siblings.  It 
includes all 3 criteria of PNEED for the respondent’s sibling(s) – plus an additional indicator of 
whether the sibling was looking for employment.17  In each of the Tables, 4-6, there are four 
specifications that include PNEED and/or SNEED.  Two of these include each of the two 
measures entered without the other.  The remaining two include both measures entered as either 
two separate dummies or as a string of dummies measuring the combinations of both a parent 
and a sibling that experience economic hardship (BPSNEED), and need experienced either by 
parents or siblings (but not both)—ORPSNEED—with neither parents nor siblings in need as the 
omitted, reference category.  The tables also include separate specifications that contain both a 
PAFDC and SAFDC parameter to measure the isolated effects of a parent or sibling receiving 
AFDC or food stamps.  These two indicators are important to isolate because they offer 
information concerning how one of the largest publicly supported poverty programs can 
indirectly impact the wealth accumulation of the middle class.18 
 
The estimates listed in Tables 4 and 5 describe the marginal effects of each regressor on the 
respective probabilities of ACCOUNT and STOCK OWNERSHIP evaluated at the mean value 
of the other regressors.  Table 6 lists the coefficients for the household WEALTH regressions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be statistically significant.  However, sample size limitations prevent us from placing too much confidence in these 
results.   
15 All regressions were estimated using the Stata cluster procedure to account for the fact that there will be some 
correlation across observations for any middle class families who have more than one sibling in the sample.  All 
regressions are unweighted regressions that include a constant term. 
16 The income measure is a five year average of labor income over the period 1987-1991.  It is averaged to provide a 
long-term measure of income.  The use of pre-1994 years avoids contemporaneous simultaneity bias with the 
outcome variables. 
17An employment indicator for parents was not included in order to avoid confounding in the indicator that could 
result from the presence of retired and semi-retired workers in the parent population. 
18 In our analysis AFDC is employed as an indicator of poverty status and financial burden for middle class kin, but 
it also may serve to relieve some of the financial burden by substituting public support for some potential burdens on 
middle class kin.  To the extent that it also has this latter effect, the real effect of having kin with low endowments 
may be stronger than our analysis will suggest. 
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The first column of each table lists the baseline parameter estimates without any measures of 
parental or sibling poverty.  Subsequent columns report the results of other models that each 
incorporate various measures of poverty in the family. 
 
The effect of the baseline control variables 
 
Most of the demographic and economic variables that typically are entered into regressions for 
asset accumulation have the standard effects found throughout the literature.  In the case of stock 
ownership for example, the life-cycle parameters, AGE and AGESQ, appear statistically 
significant with the expected signs – positive for AGE and negative for AGESQ.  For account 
ownership, both signs are in the expected direction; however neither variable attains statistical 
significance.  Neither variable is statistically significant in the wealth regressions either.  As 
expected, the remaining economic parameters, EDUCATION, MGR AND PROF. 
OCCUPATION, and AVG. LIFETIME INCOME, have positive coefficients for all three 
outcomes.  However, the effect of EDUCATION on WEALTH was surprisingly not statistically 
significant, and the effect of occupation on ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP appears marginally 
significant at best (p-values in the range of 0.12 to 0.15 in the different models).  In terms of the 
demographic controls, being MARRIED yields a positive effect on asset accumulation, although 
the effect for STOCK OWNERSHIP ranges from being statistically significant to marginal 
significance (p-values in the range of .090 to 0.104 for the different models).  Having a 
household head that is FEMALE and having CHILDREN yields mixed effects in Tables 4-6.  
For ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP, the variable FEMALE household head has a positive effect, 
while having CHILDREN has the expected negative effect.  For STOCK OWNERSHIP, neither 
variable is statistically significant, though both signs are negative as would be expected.  For 
WEALTH both parameters have the expected negative sign, although the gender variable is the 
only one that attains statistical significance.   
 
The effect of race and poverty in the family 
 
As shown in Tables 4-5, race affects the probability of both ACCOUNT and STOCK 
OWNERSHIP.  In the first instance, being black reduces the probability of ownership by about 
26 percent in the baseline model.  In the second instance, being black reduces the probability of 
asset ownership by about 14 percent in the baseline model.   As shown in Table 6, race has a 
similar negative and statistically significant effect on wealth accumulation.  All else being equal, 
black families are estimated to have accumulated close to $15,000 less than their white 
counterparts. 
 
Columns 2-7 of  Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the results of six additional models that include 
measures of kin poverty status in addition to the baseline controls.  As shown in Columns 3 and 
5, both the composite measure of parental poverty and the composite measure of sibling poverty 
(PNEED and SNEED respectively) are found to reduce the likelihood of ACCOUNT 
OWNERSHIP.  PNEED is estimated to reduce the likelihood of ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP by 
five percent, while the SNEED parameter indicates a six percent reduction.  When the kin 
poverty measures are entered in the same model (Column 6), both continue to lead to a reduction 
in ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP, showing about a four percent reduction in the probability of 
owning an account for parental need and about a six percent reduction for need among siblings.  
In the last model of Table 4 (Column 7), having both parents and siblings who are poor 
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(BPSNEED), relative to having neither, leads to greater than ten percent reduction in the 
probability of possessing a bank account.   
 
In Table 5, the case of STOCK OWNERSHIP, parental need (PNEED) again yields about a five 
percent reduction in the probability of asset ownership; however, in this case the parameter 
measuring need among siblings (SNEED) is not statistically significant.  In the model that 
includes both kin poverty status measures simultaneously (Model six shown in Column 6), 
poverty among parents (PNEED) is found to have the expected negative sign and to be 
statistically significant, while the effect of poverty among siblings (SNEED) is, again, not 
statistically significant.  In Model 7 (shown in Column 7), having both parents and siblings who 
are poor, relative to neither, reduces the probability of stock ownership by about 6 percent.   
 
In the wealth regressions, shown in Table 7, the composite parental need measure, PNEED, has a 
negative coefficient but it is not statistically significant in any of the models in which it is 
entered separately.  However, the composite measure of sibling need, SNEED, is found to be 
statistically significant.  Having siblings who are poor by this measure reduces wealth 
accumulation by about $7,600 to $7,400 (Models 5 and 6).  Additionally, as shown in Model 7 
(Column 7), having both a sibling and a parent who are poor appears to reduce the amount of 
wealth that is accumulated by about $9,700. 
 
When considering AFDC receipt as the measure of poverty status rather than the composite 
measures of need, the isolated effects of parental AFDC/foodstamp receipt (PAFDC) and 
AFDC/foodstamp receipt by siblings (SAFDC) are similar to the more broadly defined parental 
and sibling poverty status measures discussed above for all three outcomes.  As was the case for 
the broad, composite measure of poverty among siblings, in the case of ACCOUNT 
OWNERSHIP, SAFDC reduces the likelihood of ACCOUNT OWNERSHIP.  It falls by about 
eight percent.  Parental AFDC/foodstamp receipt does not have a statistically significant effect 
on account ownership however.  In the STOCK OWNERSHIP regressions, parental 
AFDC/foodstamp receipt has a negative and statistically significant effect, reducing the 
probability of asset ownership by about six percent; however sibling AFDC/foodstamp receipt is 
not statistically significant.  These results are comparable to the effects found for the broad, 
composite measures, PNEED and SNEED, on stock ownership.   
 
Finally, in the case of WEALTH, the isolated effects of both parental and sibling 
AFDC/foodstamp receipt (PAFDC and SAFDC) indicate a significant reduction in household 
WEALTH—over $5,000 for PAFDC and over $8,000 for SAFDC.  Parents’ AFDC/foodstamp 
receipt leads to a reduction in the amount of wealth accumulated by their middle income 
children, despite the fact that when it was combined with other measure of parental poverty the 
effect becomes non-detectable.   
 
In summary, we find evidence that both parental and sibling poverty pressures adversely affect 
asset accumulation among middle class individuals.  Parental and sibling poverty reduce the 
probability of owning a bank account; while for stock ownership, effects are found only for 
parental poverty.  For wealth, we find that both sibling poverty and parental receipt of 
AFDC/foodstamps have adverse effects on the amount of wealth that is accumulated by middle 
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income individuals.  Furthermore, we find that the addition of the various controls for poverty in 
the family consistently reduces the size of the race coefficient in all three sets of regressions. 
 
Additional controls and the interpretation of the results 
 
To check the robustness of the results and the appropriateness of the interpretation attached to 
them, additional controls for parental ownership of each individual asset under consideration and 
for the receipt of a bequest are added in Tables 4’, 5’, and 6’.  The argument for including the 
indicators of parental asset-ownership is that existing research indicates that parents may “teach” 
their children valuable information about individual assets and the mechanics of ownership, 
making those whose parents do not expose them to certain assets less likely to acquire them. 
(Chiteji and Stafford, 1999; and Chiteji and Stafford, 2000).  It therefore is important to attempt 
to distinguish the effect of parental poverty from the possibility that the poverty measures 
actually reflect the absence of this type of intergenerational transmission of knowledge.  
Accordingly, Table 4’ reports the results of regressions that incorporate a dummy variable for 
parental account ownership (PPBANK) when estimating the account ownership models; and 
Table 5’ adds a dummy variable for parental stock ownership (PPSTOCK) in the regressions for 
stock ownership.  Table 6’ presents the results from regressions for wealth that include a control 
for parental wealth.19  Each of these regressions also include a dummy variable indicating 
whether the middle class family has received an inheritance.  This modification is done to 
eliminate the possibility that the parental poverty measures would reflect poor parents’ lesser 
tendency to leave bequests than rich parents’. 
 
As shown in Table 4’, poverty among siblings (as measured by the composite measure SNEED) 
continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect even after the inclusion of the 
additional controls for parental account ownership and bequests.  Additionally, this poverty in 
the family measure continues to reduce the size of the race effect (relative to the baseline 
regression).20  Having a poor parent and a poor sibling, relative to no family member in need, 
also continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect.  Similarly sibling 
AFDC/foodstamp receipt continues to have a negative and statistically significant effect on 
account ownership.  However, the effects of parental poverty on bank account ownership are not 
robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.21  The effect remains negative, but it is no 
longer statistically significant. 
 
For stock ownership, the inclusion of the additional controls alters our results more dramatically.  
While effects previously were found for both the broad, composite measure of parental poverty 
                                                          
19 These variables are taken from the 1984 wealth supplement so that the time of the observation is closer to the time 
that now middle class adults of interest would have been children in their parents’ homes.  Additionally, making 
them contemporaneous with the parental poverty measures creates the danger of introducing collinearity. 
20 This suggests that part of the race effect that is routinely found in the literature may be attributable to a greater 
incidence of poverty in the family among black families.  To explore this issue in more detail, we attempted 
regressions that interact race with the poverty in the family variables, and we ran separate models by race.  These 
regressions did not yield statistically significant results for the race interaction terms or for the poverty in the family 
variables in the black-only regressions.  However, it is unclear whether this indicates that there are no differential 
effects of poverty in the family for black families.  The result also may be due to sample size limitations.   
21 Although whether this is due to the absence of an effect or to the presence of multicollinearity remains an open 
question. 
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and for parental AFDC/foodstamp receipt, the effects of these two variables are reduced to 
marginal statistical significance once the additional controls are added (p-values of 0.13 and 
0.106 respectively).  Similarly, the effect of having both a poor parent and a poor sibling, relative 
to having neither, now becomes only marginally significant (p-value of 0.11).  However, in each 
case, the inclusion of the poverty in the family measures still reduces the size of the effect found 
for race. 
 
How do the additional controls affect the wealth regressions?  Parental AFDC/foodstamp receipt 
and sibling AFDC/foodstamp receipt both continue to have negative and statistically significant 
effects, though, curiously, BPSNEED no longer has a statistically significant effect on wealth 
levels.   Additionally, the inclusion of these poverty in the family measures continues to reduce 
the size of the coefficient that is found for race. 
 
V.  A perspective on these results 
 
Midgley (2000) notes that it is possible to view assets and asset-oriented policy in both a 
positivist and a normative light.   Furthermore, he argues that it is important to avoid shying 
away from contextual considerations, such as the way that a focus on assets fits into society’s 
values and beliefs.  The results of our analysis submit themselves to both positive and normative 
interpretation, as they have implications for debates about the appropriate structure of welfare 
policy and social justice.   
 
The regression analysis offers evidence to support the hypothesis that poverty in the extended 
family serves as a constraint on asset accumulation.  How does one discern the importance, or 
economic and socio-political significance of this result?  From the standpoint of social welfare 
policy, the results suggest that policy makers and social commentators must remember that 
policies for the poor can have implications for the non-poor.  Hence it is not clear that welfare 
policy should be evaluated solely from the perspective of its effect on the poor.  
 
Considering the recent changes to the structure of welfare programs for example, to the extent 
that the reforms that were instituted upon the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 reduce the amount of publicly provided support that is 
available to poor families, they may increase the strain on the non-poor relatives of former 
welfare recipients.  As Caskey (2000) notes, the lives of the poor are filled with vulnerability, 
financial uncertainty, and worry.  The limited resources of the poor put them in situations in 
which they often need some type of outside support.  This may cause little concern for those who 
believe that family-based assistance and other sources of private charity are preferable to public 
assistance.  In fact, they may add that this is how the world should be—that family members, not 
the government, should bear responsibility for the poor.  However, it is important to note that 
such a view implicitly accepts the proposition that it is appropriate for some citizens who “play 
by the rules” to be rendered less able to accumulate wealth than other citizens.   
 
Our results suggest that the non-poor who ascribe to the same values of thriftiness, future 
orientation, and willingness to delay gratification that those on the right argue should be 
rewarded (as evidenced by these middle class families’ having endured the sacrifices required to 
obtain middle class educations and by their having worked diligently enough to obtain middle 
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class incomes and middle class occupations) will nevertheless be disadvantaged relative to their 
counterparts who do not have poor relatives.  Whether one views this outcome as acceptable 
depends on one’s stance on the issue of fairness.  Less troublesome for policymakers, our results 
suggest that changes in policy that promote saving and asset accumulation among the poor may 
enable the poor to build up sufficient reserves to allow them to avoid having to turn to their non-
poor relatives in times of trouble.  
 
Our results also have implications for the public discussion of social justice.  The finding that 
poverty in the family constrains asset accumulation potentially explains why black families have 
less wealth than white families do, on average.  The greater likelihood of asset poverty among 
minorities that is found by Haveman and Wolff (2000) may be tied to differences in the poverty 
rates within the extended family, as our research reveals that even the non-poor may struggle to 
accumulate assets if they have poor relatives who rely on them for support.  This certainly has 
negative consequences for the ability of middle class black families to engage in the kind of 
leveraging and use of assets to ensure better educational opportunities and success for their 
offspring that Shapiro and Johnson (2000) describe as being important for many middle class 
white Americans.  It also provides further suggestion that not all families who “play by the rules” 
will necessarily attain the outcomes that many expect the hardworking and the thrifty to attain 
automatically.  Our research suggests that those who are--by chance and certainly through no 
action of their own--born into families with poor relatives will not reap the same rewards from 
their diligent behavior that those who are blessed with rich relatives will reap. 
 
VI.  Concluding remarks 
 
The mechanisms by which the structure and characteristics of the nuclear family influence 
household behavior and individual outcomes have received a substantial amount of attention 
within the social sciences literature.  This paper finds evidence that, when attempting to 
understand saving behavior, the structure and characteristics of the extended family also have 
important implications for the decisions and choices that families make.  We find that poverty 
among relatives can serve as a constraint on asset accumulation.  The exploration of different 
economic theories of saving reveals that if an individual is altruistic, concern about a poor 
relative can affect the amount that is saved adversely.  Low levels of consumption among 
relatives and uncertainty surrounding relatives’ future position both influence saving behavior.  
This theoretical analysis leads to mixed predictions about the direction of the effect that is to be 
expected from the concern about poor relatives, however.  This is somewhat surprising because 
intuition might suggest that having a poor relative would always depress savings and lessen 
wealth accumulation.  Such a suspicion proves to be inaccurate because of the variety of motives 
for which people save and the variety of circumstances in which their saving occurs.  Empirical 
research therefore appears better situated to sort out the actual effect that concern for poor 
relatives will have in practice.   Our empirical tests of the hypothesis that having poor relatives 
affects asset accumulation offers support for the hypothesis that asset accumulation is affected 
adversely by the presence of poor relatives in the family tree.  Regression analysis indicates that 
poverty among siblings and parents has a detrimental effect on levels of wealth, and on the 
probability of owning both bank accounts and stock. 
 
These findings may help explain some of the wealth gaps that presently are observed in the 
United States.  They suggest that some low-wealth families may have a hard time accumulating 
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assets because of the precarious position of their extended family members (rather than due to 
some “behavioral” deficiency such as lack of thrift, or short-sightedness).  Therefore it is unclear 
that low-wealth status can reasonably be interpreted as evidence of profligate spending or failure 
to take an interest in the future, positions that are sometimes tempting to take in public 
discussions about minorities and the poor. 
 
As for the policy implications that emerge, our research suggests that policies that reduce public 
support for poor people may have unintended consequences for the non-poor, and that these 
consequences need not be evenly distributed throughout the U.S. population.  Families with 
many poor kin, such as newly minted middle class families who emerge from humble 
circumstances, stand to bear a greater portion of the cost of caring for the poor in cases in which 
the responsibility of providing for the poor shifts from the public sector to private individuals.  
Therefore it is not only important to ask what has happened to the families that have vanished 
from the welfare rolls since the implementation of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and how they are faring.  It is equally important to ask 
how their relatives are faring, to determine whether non-poor relatives are becoming low-wealth 
relatives due to a need to provide assistance to poor family members. 
 
The primary theme emerging from this research is that there are important connections among 
family members—particularly poor and non-poor kin—that need to be recognized by social 
science researchers and policy makers.  Poverty appears to not be entirely isolated in its effects.  
The fates of ascriptively different family members appear to be somewhat intertwined. 
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 b
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 p
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/re
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tin
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